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UNWRAPPING RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION CLAIMS: 
THE IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE AFTER 
EEOC V. ABERCROMBIE 
Valerie Weiss* 
 
You never get a second chance to make a first impression. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Let’s say four people show up for a job interview . . . . So the first 
is a Sikh man wearing a turban, the second is a Hasidic man wearing a 
hat, the third is a Muslim woman wearing a hijab, [and] the fourth is a 
Catholic nun in a habit,”1 Justice Alito proposed during oral argument 
in EEOC v. Abecrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.2  Although this may seem like 
the start of a casual dinner table joke, this hypothetical, in part, mirrors 
a real scenario that quickly escalated into a religious discrimination 
lawsuit. 
In 2008, Samantha Elauf, a 17-year-old community college 
student, interviewed for a “model” (i.e., salesperson) position at 
Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., but Abercrombie turned her down.3  
Although Elauf initially scored high marks on the interview checklist, 
meeting the expectations for hire,4 the hiring manager later lowered 
Elauf’s score, as per the request of a higher-ranking employee, so that 
she was no longer eligible for the position.5  Abercrombie denied Elauf 
the retail job because the hijab6 that Elauf wore to the interview 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2016; B.A., summa cum laude, 
Rutgers University, 2012.  Special thanks to my faculty advisor, Dean Charles Sullivan, 
and my comment editor, Isabelle Fabian, for their invaluable guidance and thoughtful 
feedback on this Comment.  I would also like to thank my family for their constant 
love and support.  
 1  Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).  
 2  135 S. Ct. at 2028. 
 3  See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1112–14 (10th 
Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014). 
 4  Id.   
 5  Id.  
 6  Id. at 1111 n.1 (citing JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 310 (4th ed. 
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conflicted with Abercrombie’s “Look Policy.”7  Abercrombie 
staffcorrectlyassumed that Elauf was Muslim and further assumed 
that her practice of wearing a hijab would have required an exemption 
from the company’s Look Policy.8  Notably, neither the hiring manager 
nor Elauf discussed the clothing conflict at the interview. 
Elauf filed a religious discrimination suit against Abercrombie, 
alleging that the company failed to provide her a reasonable religious 
accommodation, in contravention of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.9  In response, Abercrombie argued that it was not required to 
accommodate Elauf’s religious beliefs—even though it knew about 
them—because Elauf failed to inform the store that she would need an 
exemption from the Look Policy.10 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from 
two forms of discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate 
impact.11  The disparate treatment provision of Title VII prohibits 
employers from: (1) failing to hire an applicant (2) because of (3) 
“such individual’s . . . religion” (which includes her religious 
practice).12  The disparate impact theory prohibits employers “from 
using a facially neutral employment practice that has an unjustified 
impact on members of a protected class.”13  Title VII also incorporates 
a mandate of accommodation of employees’ religious practices.14  
 
2011)) (defining a “hijab” as the “veil or head covering worn by Muslim women in 
public”).  Some Islam scholars interpret the Quran to require women to wear a hijab, 
or headscarf, in order to show their modesty.  MANAL HAMZEH, PEDAGOGIES OF 
DEVEILING: MUSLIM GIRLS AND THE HIJAB DISCOURSE 79 (Curry Stephenson Malott ed., 
2012).  There is no single type of hijab that must be worn by a devout Muslim woman; 
there are many different styles and colors of hijabs or headscarves that are consistent 
with Islam.  PAUL GWYNNE, WORLD RELIGIONS IN PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE 
INTRODUCTION 235 (2008).  For the purposes of this Comment, the terms “hijab” and 
“headscarf” are used interchangeably. 
 7  Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1114.  The Abercrombie brand exemplifies a classic East 
Coast collegiate style of clothing.  The company’s “Look Policy” requires all of its 
employees to dress in clothing that is consistent with the kinds of clothing it sells in its 
stores, and as a part of its policy, the company “prohibits employees from wearing 
caps;” notably, the policy does not explain the meaning of the term “cap.”  Id. at 1111.   
 8  Id. at 1114. 
 9  Id. at 1112.  
 10  Id. at 1114.  
 11  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (2014). 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id.  
 14  Before the Abercrombie decision, the lower courts and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in its employment guidelines have understood 
failure-to-accommodate religious practices as a separate, third category under Title 
VII; however, as all nine justices of the Abercrombie Court make clear, failure-to-
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Traditionally, to bring a religious accommodation claim, the applicant 
must show that: (1) she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted 
with an employment requirement; (2) she informed her employer of this 
belief; and (3) she was not accommodated, resulting in sufficiently 
adverse employment action.15 
Applying Title VII’s reasonable accommodation mandate, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), reasoning that Abercrombie had 
enough notice to make it aware that there was a conflict between 
Elauf’s religious belief or practice and the Look Policy requirement of 
the job.16  Specifically, the court determined the EEOC met its burden 
by showing that Elauf wore the headscarf to the interview, the 
interviewing manager assumed that Elauf was a Muslim and wore the 
headscarf for religious reasons, and the interviewing manager 
conferred with the district manager because she thought that Elauf 
would require an accommodation of the store’s Look Policy.17 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit reversed the district court and instead ordered summary 
judgment in favor of Abercrombie.18  Abercrombie’s winning 
argument stated that an applicant needed to provide explicit, direct 
notice to the employer of her religious practices.19  Therefore, Elauf 
failed to satisfy the notice provision of accommodation because she did 
not explicitly inform the interviewing manager that she wore a hijab 
for religious reasons and would need an accommodation due to a 
conflict between her religious practice and the store’s policy.20  Because 
Elauf failed to make any such statement or request, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that Abercrombie could not have violated Title VII.21  
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit rejected the EEOC’s position that 
 
accommodate is merely a way to characterize disparate treatment or disparate impact 
claims.  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2041 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  For purposes of this 
Comment, it is helpful to still provide the failure-to-accommodate claims as previously 
understood by the lower courts.  
 15  Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1122 (citing Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 
225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000)); see also Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 
F.3d 495, 499 n.9 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 16  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1286 (N.D. 
Okla. 2011).  
 17  Id. at 1286.  
 18  Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1110–11. 
 19  Id. at 1122–23. 
 20  Id. at 1122.  
 21  Id.  
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either the employee informing the employer of the conflict or the 
employer otherwise becoming aware of the conflict established a prima 
facie case.22 
Although Abercrombie has since changed its Look Policy 
accommodations to avoid future claims like those of Ms. Elauf,23 the 
United States Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal by the EEOC 
to answer the question at the heart of this case: 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits a 
prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant in 
order to avoid accommodating a religious practice that it 
could accommodate without undue hardship . . . . [Does 
this] prohibition appl[y] only where an applicant has 
informed the employer of his need for an 
accommodation[?]24 
In other words, must a job applicant provide an employer with direct, 
explicit notice that she requires a religious accommodation to gain the 
protections of Title VII, or is some lesser knowledge or notice sufficient 
to trigger an employer’s duty to engage in a dialogue with the applicant 
or employee about the possible need for a religious accommodation?25  
For instance, if Abercrombie made an informed guess that Elauf wore 
a hijab for religious purposes, does that constitute “knowing?” 
On June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its 8-1 opinion, 
holding that “actual knowledge” of the need for an accommodation is 
not required, and the applicant need not specifically request an 
accommodation.  Delivering the majority opinion, Justice Scalia 
stressed that even if an employer has no more than an 
“unsubstantiated suspicion” of an applicant’s religious beliefs or 
practices, the employer violates Title VII where its action is motivated by 
a desire to avoid a potential accommodation.26  Therefore, an 
“employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed 
 
 22  Id. at 1123.  
 23  In 2013, Abercrombie issued an apology to the community after settling two 
other EEOC suits regarding discrimination against Muslim workers whose hijabs 
conflicted with the company’s “Look Policy.”  Kim Bhasin, Abercrombie Modifies 
Controversial Look Policy As Part of Settlement with Fired Muslim Workers, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/23/abercrombie-
modifies-look-policy_n_3976237.html.  The company stated: “As part of our 
commitment to fair hiring practices and fostering a diverse workplace, we continually 
evaluate our existing policies.  With respect to hijabs, in particular, we determined 
three years ago to institute policy changes that would allow such headwear.”  Id.  
 24  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015).   
 25  Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65–66 (1986).  
 26  Id.  
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or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.”27 
While Abercrombie’s central holding is a deserving win for job 
applicants, the decision still fails to answer the question: what qualifies 
as an “unsubstantiated suspicion” or a “hunch” in a motive inquiry?  By 
doing away with “knowledge” and “notice,” the majority’s “suspicion” 
standard puts an employer in uncertain situations, and it is easy to 
imagine scenarios where an employer may risk suit for both asking and 
not asking certain questions.  For instance, if an employer proactively 
describes all the workplace polices (e.g., dress attire) and asks if 
complying with these policies would pose a problem for the applicant, 
such questions may be characterized as intended to weed out specific 
groups, and therefore, considered suspect.  Furthermore, if the 
applicant states that she, in fact, cannot comply with the policies, the 
employer may be tempted to ask explicitly whether her reason is based 
on a religious belief.  Such an action complicates common and 
accepted practice where employers avoid asking applicants questions 
about their religious beliefs.  Or if the applicant states she cannot 
comply with the policy but the employer does not suspect she needs an 
accommodation, will the employer face liability for not inquiring 
further?  The last scenario highlights Justice Alito’s point in his 
concurrence: the Court cannot just do away with the knowledge and 
notice standards because an inquiry into motive still raises questions of 
what the employer, in reality, “knew” at the time of the interview.28 
The Abercrombie case depicts how navigating a work-religion issue 
is more challenging than ever—for both the employee and the 
employer.29  Claims of workplace religious discrimination are on the 
rise.  Since 2000, religious discrimination claims filed with the EEOC 
have almost doubled, with 3502 claims filed in 2015.30  In light of 
today’s globalized world, technology advances, and emphasis on 
political correctness, it can be difficult for employers to balance their 
interests against employees’ interests.  Employers are ultimately 
interested in running their business operations as they see fit, but are 
limited by the protections Title VII affords to employees.31  Central to 
 
 27  Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033.  
 28  Id. at 2035–36 (Alito, J., concurring in part).  
 29  See also Press Release, EEOC, Abercrombie & Fitch Settles Two Pending EEOC 
Religious Discrimination Suits (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
newsroom/release/9-23-13c.cfm.   
 30  Religion-Based Charges FY 1997– FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/religion.cfm (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2016). 
 31  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2014).  With the passage of Title VII, Congress 
extended the protection of religious freedom to the workplace.  
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the determination of the notice standard dispute was the tension 
between an employer’s right to run business operations and an 
employee’s right to religious freedom. 
This Comment argues that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision about a college student and her part-time job has far-reaching 
implications for the American workplace; specifically, the new law fails 
to provide any guidelines for employer “best practices” during the 
interactive hiring process.  Part II of this Comment provides a brief 
overview of religious discrimination claims under Title VII and the 
framework for analyzing such claims.  Part III reviews the previous 
circuit split on religious reasonable accommodation claims as a 
starting point to discuss the EEOC and Abercrombie’s positions in 
front of the high court.  Part IV examines the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Abercrombie, with a specific focus on the “suspicion” standard Justice 
Scalia employed in the majority opinion and the more practical aspect 
of Justice Alito’s concurrence.  Part V considers the aftermath of the 
Abercrombie decision, particularly how the clarified religious 
accommodation claims analysis affects future claims, as well as pending 
litigation in the lower courts.  Part VI discusses the impact on employer 
“best practices” after the Supreme Court failed to account for the 
practical aspects of interviewing, the balancing of employer and 
employee interests, and society’s interest in eliminating unfair 
employment discrimination to allow for the most just outcome.  Part 
VII concludes. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN 
DISPARATE TREATMENT AND RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION CLAIMS 
BEFORE ABERCROMBIE 
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress 
declared the elimination of discrimination a national goal of the 
highest priority.32  Unlawful discrimination in the employment context 
falls under Title VII, which states that it is “an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion,” subject to 
certain limitations.33  In 1972, Congress added to Title VII an express 
obligation of employers to reasonably accommodate an employee 
 
 32  See S. REP. No. 872, pt. 1, at 11, 24 (1964).  
 33  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2014).  
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when that employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs, practices, or 
observance conflict with a work requirement, absent undue hardship 
to the employer.34  Until the recent Abercrombie decision, employers and 
employees alike have understood failure to accommodate claims as a 
third avenue of liability under Title VII, in addition to disparate 
treatment and disparate impact.  Before addressing the recent 
clarification of Title VII claims, this section will provide an overview of 
disparate treatment and religious accommodation claims in past 
jurisprudence. 
A. Per Se Discrimination 
Disparate treatment claims arise where an employer takes an 
“adverse employment action”35 due to the employee’s religion.36  An 
employee can prove a disparate treatment claim through direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent, such as, “I would never hire her 
because she is Jewish,” or indirectly through presumptions and shifts 
in the burden of proof.  In cases where the intentional discrimination 
must be proven through indirect evidence, the Supreme Court has 
established a burden-shifting framework.37 
To establish a prima facie case, the employee must show that: (1) 
she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the 
position she held; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and 
(4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to 
the inference of discrimination.38  The establishment of a prima facie 
 
 34  § 2000e(j); TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977). 
 35  For purposes of a Title VII discrimination claim, an “adverse employment 
action” is a tangible change in work conditions that produces a material employment 
disadvantage.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2014); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.  For 
instance, a materially adverse action might include: discharge; demotion or transfer 
accompanied by decreased wages or salary, a less distinguished job title, a material loss 
of benefits, and/or a loss of seniority; a supervisor’s decision not to take action to stop 
harassment by co-workers in retaliation for employee’s opposition to civil rights 
violations; or a permanent transfer to another shift where the change in work hours 
impacted employee’s ability to continue her education.  U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL NO. 915.003 § 8-II(D) (2008) 
[hereinafter EEOC Compl. Man.]. 
 36  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (refusal to 
rehire allegedly based on racial discrimination); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 
507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (discussing disparate treatment claims in the context of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967). 
 37  McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.  
 38  Marmulszteyn v. Napolitano, 523 F. App’x 13, 15 (2013) (quoting Ruiz v. 
County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 2009)); Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 
F.2d 1100, 1105–06 (4th Cir. 1985) (reasoning that the inference of discrimination 
may include comparator evidence if an employee can show that the employer treated 
the employee more harshly than other employees of a different religion, or no 
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case creates a presumption of discrimination, which will result in 
liability unless the employer proffers a “legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason” for the adverse employment decision.39  If the employer is able 
to put such a reason into evidence, the plaintiff may still prevail by 
demonstrating that the proffered reason was merely a pretext (i.e., a 
cover up) for unlawful religious discrimination.40  The burden of 
persuasion remains on the employee throughout.41 
B. Religious Accommodation Claims 
The duty to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs is 
“implicated only when there is a conflict between an employee’s 
religious practice and the employer’s neutral policy.”42  To make a 
prima facie case of failure to accommodate a religious belief, the 
employee traditionally had to show that: (1) she had a bona fide 
religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; (2) 
she informed her employer of this belief; and (3) she was fired or not hired 
for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.43  
Further, the fact that violating the employer’s rule is otherwise a 
legitimate reason for discharge is irrelevant: the duty of 
accommodation requires the employer to grant an exception to such 
a rule if the accommodation is reasonable and does not pose an undue 
hardship.44  The plaintiff must also prove that there was an 
 
religion, who had engaged in similar conduct).  
 39  McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
 40  Id.  
 41  Id.  
 42  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1120 (10th Cir. 
2013).(quoting EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(1)).  
 43  Id. at 1122 (citing Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 
(10th Cir. 2000)); see also Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 499 n.9 
(5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 44  Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir. 1996).  The 
court in Chalmers provides the following example:  
[A]n employee who is terminated for refusing to work on Sundays can 
maintain an accommodation claim even if other nonreligious employees 
were also fired for refusing Sunday work, and even though the 
employer’s proffered reason for the discharge—the refusal to perform 
required Sunday work—is legitimate and nondiscriminatory (because 
the Sunday work rule applies to all employees, regardless of religion).  If 
the employee has notified the employer of his religious need to take 
Sundays off, the burden rests on the employer to show that it could not 
accommodate the employee’s religious practice without undue 
hardship. 
Id.  
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accommodation available and that the request was reasonable.45  After 
an employee makes such a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
employer: (1) to rebut one or more elements of the plaintiff’s case;46 
(2) to show that it offered a reasonable accommodation of religious 
practice;47 or (3) to show that the accommodation would work an 
undue hardship upon the employer and its business.48 
As noted supra, this Comment focuses primarily on the second 
element of the prima facie case of a reasonable accommodation claim: 
when does the employer have knowledge or information of the 
employee’s belief, such that the employer is aware of a possible conflict 
between the employee’s belief and her employment?  To better 
address this question, it is helpful to break down the religious 
accommodation framework into discrete parts.  As a practical matter, 
there are three main issues to consider when addressing requests for 
accommodations: (1) what is a bona fide religious belief; (2) what 
constitutes a religious accommodation request that is entitled to Title 
VII protection; and (3) what is the extent of the employer’s obligation 
to reasonably accommodate religious beliefs or practices? 
 
 
 45  See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002) (holding that, in 
the Americans with Disabilities Act context, the employee must prove the 
reasonableness of an accommodation request). 
 46  Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1156.  The Tenth Circuit has also noted that using the 
McDonnell Douglas framework in a religious accommodation context presents a 
different inquiry.  The Thomas court reasoned:  
Thus, we use the burden-shifting mechanism, not to probe the subjective 
intent of the employer, but rather simply to provide a useful structure by 
which the district court . . . can determine whether the various parties 
have advanced sufficient evidence to meet their respective traditional 
burdens to prove or disprove the reasonableness of the accommodations 
offered or not offered.   
Id. at 1155 n.6 (quoting Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1178 n.12 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 47  See, e.g., Barnett, 535 U.S. at 391.  
 48  See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).  The extent 
of hardship to the business that must be shown is minimal, but it must be more than 
mere inconvenience or some modest hardship.  Id. at 84.  The test is whether the 
employer would suffer “more than a de minimis cost” by accommodation.  Id.  Despite 
the minimal showing required by an employer to defeat an accommodation claim, 
the accommodation requirement does impose some burden on an employer and does 
favor the employee’s rights over the employer’s rights, at least to the extent of 
prohibiting utterly arbitrary discrimination against any person based solely on the 
employee’s religious beliefs and practices.  Id.; see also Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics 
Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 401 (9th Cir. 1978).   
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1. Bona Fide Religious Belief 
Title VII defines “religion” to include those “aspects of religious 
observance and practice” that an employer is able to “reasonably 
accommodate without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business.”49  Courts have held that religion includes both 
traditional mainstream religions, such as Judaism, Islam, and 
Christianity, and non-mainstream religions that may or may not be 
traditionally recognized as a formal, organized church.50  Religion also 
encompasses atheism,51 as well as beliefs that are “only subscribed to by 
a small number of people, or that seem illogical or unreasonable to 
others.”52  A religious belief usually embodies distinctive, ultimate ideas 
about life, purpose, and death,53 but does not include “[s]ocial, 
political, or economic philosophies, [or] personal preferences.”54 
Because the expansive definition of “religion” raises opportunities 
for a particular employee to falsely use “religion” to avoid job burdens 
or obtain job benefits,55 the determination on this issue generally will 
depend on the fact finder’s assessment of the employee’s sincerity.56  In 
United States v. Seeger, the Court reasoned that “[w]hile the ‘truth’ of a 
 
 49  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2014). 
 50  Telfair v. Fed. Express Corp., 934 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1383 (S.D. Fla. 2013); EEOC 
Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1). 
 51  Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(“The incorporation of some form of deity . . . into a belief system is not required for 
Title VII protection, which recognizes atheism as a religion.”) (citing Reed v. Great 
Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003)).  
 52  Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981); see also 
EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de 
P.R., 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (reiterating that religious beliefs do not need to 
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others). 
 53  Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448; see Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“[W]hen a person sincerely holds beliefs dealing with issues of ultimate 
concern that for her occupy a place parallel to that filled by God in traditionally 
religious persons, those beliefs represent her religion.”) (internal quotations and 
ellipses omitted); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1). 
 54  EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1), Ex. 6. (“Personal Preference 
That is Not a Religious Belief”); Telfair, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (noting that an 
employer is not obligated to accommodate an employee’s purely personal 
preference); Slater v. King Soopers, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 809, 810 (D. Colo. 1992) 
(explaining that the Ku Klux Klan is not a religion, but rather an organization political 
and social in nature); cf. Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 1:11-
cv-00917, 2012 WL 6721098, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2012) (“The [c]ourt finds it 
plausible that [p]laintiff could subscribe to veganism with a sincerity equating that of 
traditional religious views.”).   
 55  MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
405 (2d ed. 2012).  
 56  Union Independiente, 279 F.3d at 56.  
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belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question 
whether it is ‘truly held.’”57  An analysis of plaintiff’s sincerity, however, 
“does not require a deep analysis of his conscious and/or subconscious 
reasons or motives for holding his beliefs,” mainly because, as the 
Court notes, “[t]hese are matters of interpretation where the law must 
tread lightly.”58  Therefore, a relevant consideration for the fact finder 
is whether the employee’s conduct aligns with her professed belief.59 
These ideas and principles about life, purpose, and death “have 
significant implications for the enforcement of Title VII’s proscription 
against religious discrimination.”60  First, a religious belief is not merely 
a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction.61  
So if the belief does not truly relate to religious matters (i.e., ultimate 
ideas), the person’s conduct associated with that belief is not protected 
under Title VII.62  Second, to further complicate the analysis, an 
employee may personally possess a religious belief even if such belief 
is not reflected in the tenets of that individual’s announced faith.63  Put 
differently, an employee’s beliefs can deviate from the tenets of her 
formal religion, but still be considered sincere, religious beliefs 
covered under Title VII.64  And third, an employee may engage in what 
 
 57  United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (clarifying the definition of 
religion and holding that a belief is religious if it “is sincere and meaningful [and] 
occupies a place in the life of the [employee] parallel to that filled by the orthodox 
belief in God”). 
 58  Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 452–54.   
 59  See Union Independiente, 279 F.3d at 56–57 (denying summary judgment where 
evidence existed that the employee’s conduct was contrary to the tenets of his 
professed religious belief); see also Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 451–52 (holding the plaintiff 
produced enough evidence of his desire to return to Nigeria to perform funeral rights 
for his father, such that his desire came from his personal and sincere religious 
beliefs).  
 60  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1119 (10th Cir. 2013).  
 61  Id. 
 62  Id.; see Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n 
employee is not permitted to redefine a purely personal preference or aversion as a 
religious belief.”); cf. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483–84 (10th Cir. 
1996) (determining, for purposes of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, whether 
a belief qualifies as a “religious belief” by assessing, inter alia, whether the belief 
“address[es] fundamental questions about life, purpose, and death”). 
 63  Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335–36, 343 (1970) (noting that the 
petitioner’s objection to engage in war was religious even though his church did not 
teach those beliefs).  
 64  Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that the employee’s belief that she needed to use the phrase “Have a Blessed 
Day” was a religious practice covered by Title VII even though using the phrase was 
not a requirement of her religion); Rivera v. Choice Courier, Sys., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 
2096 (CBM), 2004 WL 1444852, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2004) (finding that the 
statutory language providing that Title VII encompasses “all aspects of religious 
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appears to be a religious practice, but does so for cultural or other 
reasons.65  Such behavior would fall outside the protections of Title VII 
and not require an accommodation.66 
While an employer need only accommodate sincerely held 
beliefs, the EEOC suggests that employers should ordinarily assume 
that an employee’s request for a religious accommodation is sincere.67  
An employer, however, can request additional information if he has an 
objective basis for questioning either the religious nature or the 
sincerity of an employee’s belief or practice.68  Although not 
dispositive, factors relevant to evaluating the sincerity of an employee’s 
beliefs include: (1) whether the employee has behaved in a manner 
inconsistent with his or her proclaimed religious belief; (2) whether 
the requested accommodation is a highly desirable benefit likely 
sought for secular reasons; (3) whether the timing of the 
accommodation request is suspect; and/or (4) whether the employer 
otherwise has reason to believe that the accommodation is not sought 
for religious reasons.69 
2.  Religious Accommodation Requests Entitled to Title 
VII Protection 
Although the term could include other requests, religious 
accommodation requests fall predominantly into two categories: 
dress/grooming policies70 and scheduling.71  For example, religious 
 
observance and practice, as well as belief,” means that Title VII “protects more than . . . 
practices specifically mandated by an employee’s religion”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 65  Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1119. 
 66  Id.  
 67  EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(2)-(3). 
 68  Id. §12-I(A)(3). 
 69  Id. §12-I(A)(2) (citing cases). 
 70  Employees in these types of cases generally seek to wear an article of clothing 
that does not conform to an employer’s uniform or dress policy.  See, e.g., EEOC v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (permitting 
Muslim employee to wear her hijab at work as accommodation of her religious belief 
would not have resulted in undue hardship to clothing retailer); EEOC v. Alamo Rent-
A-Car LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2006) (holding employer failed to satisfy its 
burden to show it initiated good faith efforts to reasonably accommodate an 
employee’s religious practice of wearing a head covering during Muslim holiday of 
Ramadan); Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (failing to 
establish any element of a prima facie case regarding his employer’s refusal to let 
employee work with a beard as a banquet waiter); Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F. 
Supp. 2d 923 (D.N.J. 1999) (sufficiently alleging that the City of Newark terminated 
employee for refusing to shave his beard). 
 71  Employees in these types of cases wish to have time off to worship.  See, 
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observances or practices may include attending religious services, 
praying, wearing religious garb or symbols, displaying religious objects, 
following certain dietary guidelines, or refraining from certain 
activities.72  Yet, whether a particular practice is based on a “religious” 
belief will turn “not on the nature of the activity but on the employee’s 
motivation.”73  For example, an employee may forego a flu vaccine for 
religious reasons, while another employee might refrain from the shot 
for health reasons or based on personal preference.74  So, in one case 
the practice might be subject to Title VII reasonable accommodation 
requirements, while the latter employee’s restrictions would not be.  
Whether or not an activity is “religious” becomes a fact-based, case-by-
case inquiry focusing on the employee’s motivations for the practice in 
question. 
3.  Employer Obligations under Title VII 
As previously stated, under Title VII an employer has the 
obligation to reasonably accommodate an employee’s sincerely held 
religious beliefs, practices, or observance, unless the accommodation 
would cause an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business.75  Therefore, there is typically an interactive process between 
the employer and employee in an effort for the employer to reasonably 
 
e.g., Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that defendant reasonably accommodated employee’s observance that prevented 
letter carrier from working Saturdays when it approved his use of leave on Saturdays, 
approved use of substitutes when they could be found, and recommended he bid on 
position that would not require him to work on Saturdays); EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, 
Inc., 108 F.3d 1569 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding employer’s offer to allow employees to 
take a day off from work other than Yom Kippur was not 
reasonable accommodation of religious practices of employees who requested that day 
off because offered accommodation did not eliminate conflict between employment 
requirement and religious practice); EEOC v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 
2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (opining employer’s offer to allow employee to swap shifts was 
not a reasonable accommodation because he could not work Sundays and could not 
personally ask another to work his Sunday shift). 
 72  EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1). 
 73  Id. (citing cases).  Compare Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (holding employer not liable for denying employee’s request to be absent 
from work on particular dates to attend religious pilgrimage where evidence showed 
that her religious needs could be met by going on the pilgrimage at another time and 
that the particular dates she requested were simply a personal preference), with Heller 
v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding the employer liable for failing 
to accommodate Jewish employee’s attendance of spouse’s conversion ceremony). 
 74  EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1) (citing LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 
F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that “although not all Seventh-day Adventists are 
vegetarian, an individual adherent’s genuine religious belief in such a dietary practice 
warrants constitutional protection under the First Amendment”)). 
 75  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2014). 
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accommodate the employee’s religious belief.  If an accommodation is 
available and that accommodation is not an undue hardship for the 
employer, the employer is required to provide it.  Title VII, however, 
does not define the exact parameters of “reasonable accommodation” 
or “undue hardship,” which may make it difficult for the employer to 
understand the extent of its obligation.  Before its decision in 
Abercrombie, the Supreme Court has twice interpreted religious 
accommodation claims under Title VII, the first case addressing the 
scope of a reasonable accommodation and the second case defining 
the parameters of undue hardship.76 
In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, the Court held that 
employers need offer only reasonable accommodations, whether an 
employee’s preferred option or any other, to meet their statutory 
obligation.77  A reasonable accommodation is an adjustment to 
workplace requirements that eliminates conflict between the 
employer’s job requirements and the employee’s religious beliefs or 
practices.78  The burden of attempting to accommodate an employee’s 
bona fide religious observance or practice rests with the 
employer.79  Even so, Title VII does not require an employer to 
accommodate the religious practices of an employee exactly the way 
the employee requests.80  Once the employer proposes a reasonable 
accommodation, its obligation under Title VII is discharged and the 
employee cannot insist on a different accommodation.81  Yet, 
sometimes the details matter: an employer’s proposed accommodation 
will not be considered reasonable if a more favorable accommodation 
is given to other employees for nonreligious purposes.82 
 
 
 76  See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
 77  Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69.  
 78  Morissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 
2007); Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Telfair v. Fed. Express Corp., 934 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1384 (S.D. Fla. 2013); EEOC 
Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(3). 
 79  EEOC v. Townley Eng’g. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 80  Mathewson v. Fla. Game & Fresh Water Comm., 693 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (M.D. 
Fla. 1988); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(3). 
 81  Telfair, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 1384 (reiterating that employer does not have to give 
employee a choice among several accommodations and does not have to give 
employee his or her preferred accommodation); Mathewson, 693 F. Supp. at 1050. 
 82  Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70–71 (“[U]npaid leave is not a reasonable 
accommodation when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious 
ones . . . .”).  
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In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Court essentially 
reduced the demands on employers by holding that “undue hardship” 
must be more than a “de minimis” cost to the employer, which may be 
evaluated in terms of loss of profits or efficiency, injury to employee 
morale, or other criteria relevant to the individual situation.83  Because 
Title VII does not define “undue hardship,” each case turns on its own 
facts.84  Facts that influence this analysis include: (1) the cost of the 
accommodation regarding the size and operating costs of the 
employer; (2) the number of employees who will, in fact, need that 
particular accommodation; (3) the type of workplace at issue; and (4) 
the nature of the employee’s duties.85  The EEOC’s Compliance 
Manual requires that, to establish an undue hardship, the employer 
must show how much money or disruption the employee’s 
accommodation would involve.86  Furthermore, costs included in a 
court’s evaluation encompass more than direct monetary costs; they 
also include the burden on the conduct of the employer’s business.  
For example, accommodations that reduce employer efficiency,87 
impair workplace safety,88 or cause co-workers to carry the 
accommodated employee’s share of work89 involve more than a de 
minimis cost; in other words, they are unduly burdensome. 
 
 83  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 65 (1977). 
 84  Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 636 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[E]very case boils 
down to a determination as to whether the employer acted reasonably.”). 
 85  EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(B)(1).  See also Hardison, 432 U.S. at 
84 (holding that ignoring co-workers’ contractual seniority rights would be undue 
hardship, and the cost of hiring additional worker or loss of production from not 
replacing the unavailable plaintiff were beyond de minimus); Tagore v. United States, 
735 F.3d 324, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2013) (ruling that allowing Sikh employee to bring a 
ceremonial sword to work was undue hardship because request conflicted with laws 
and regulations controlling security in federal buildings); Harrell v. Donahue, 638 
F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that accommodation would have violated the 
collective bargaining agreement and would have caused more than de minimis 
imposition on co-workers). 
 86  EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(B)(1).  
 87  Brown v. Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a de minimis 
cost existed where an employer assigned his secretary to type his Bible study notes 
because the secretary would otherwise have been performing employer’s work during 
that time); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(B)(2).  
 88  Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n 
employer need not accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs if doing so would 
result in discrimination against his co-workers or deprive them of contractual or other 
statutory rights.”); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(B)(1).  
 89  Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Bhatia v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the cost of 
plaintiff’s requests accommodation was more than de minimis when it required co-
workers to assume plaintiff’s share of the hazardous work)); EEOC Compl. Man., supra 
note 35, § 12-IV(B)(2).   
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Hardison and Philbrook define the criteria for an employer to make 
an assessment of whether a religious accommodation is reasonable and 
whether the employer can make the accommodation without undue 
hardship.  Both cases underscore that the employer and the employee 
are expected to engage in an interactive communications process, by 
which the employer gathers information to determine whether it can 
accommodate the request, and the employee attempts to work with the 
employer’s proposed accommodation.90  As a result, the employer is 
expected to offer a reasonable accommodation absent an undue 
hardship.  Inevitably, reasonable accommodation and undue hardship 
require a case-by-case inquiry.91 
Ordinarily, a duty to accommodate arises once the employer has 
adequate notice of the conflict between the employee’s religious 
beliefs, work duties, and her need for an accommodation.92  While 
other protected classes have more obvious, outward characteristics, a 
person’s belief is often not readily apparent; “[a] person’s religion is 
not like his sex or race—something obvious at a glance.  Even if he 
wears a religious symbol, such as a cross or a yarmulka, this may not 
pinpoint his particular beliefs and observances.”93  Because an 
employee’s religious beliefs may not be readily apparent, an employer 
must have notice about the beliefs before it can violate the statute. 
According to the EEOC guidelines, no “magic language” is 
necessary to constitute notice; the only requirement is that the request 
alerts the employer to the presence of a religious motivation.94  That 
notice to the employer then triggers a need for the employer to obtain 
 
 90  See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(2); see also Adeyeye v. 
Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that 
managers can ask employees to clarify the nature of their requests for religious 
accommodation). 
 91  See Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Because Title 
VII does not explicitly define the terms ‘reasonably accommodate’ or ‘undue 
hardship,’ ‘the precise reach of the employer’s obligation to its employees is 
unclear . . . and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.’” (quoting Beadle v. 
Hillsborough Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994))). 
 92  See Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 450; Dixon, 627 F.3d at 856; Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 
134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that plaintiff did not provide 
sufficient notice when he simply showed up to work with a beard, in violation of 
company policy, and claimed the beard was a religious requirement); EEOC Compl. 
Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(1). 
 93  Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935–36 (7th Cir. 2003).   
 94  Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 450–51 (holding that employee’s request for leave to travel 
to Nigeria and participate in a “funeral ceremony” or “funeral rite” involving animal 
sacrifice “so that death will not come or take away any of the children’s life” [sic] was 
enough to put employer on notice that request for accommodation was 
religious); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(1). 
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more knowledge of the employee’s specific religious beliefs and 
accommodations.  Usually, this means that an employer will have a 
dialogue with the employee and inquire into the employee’s beliefs 
and practices.95  Yet, it is possible for an employer to have knowledge 
of an employee’s beliefs and practices without direct notice from an 
employee.  For instance, some circuit courts have held that employers 
are on notice of a religious conflict when they have acquired 
knowledge about the need for an accommodation through other 
sources.96 
Then, the question becomes: at what level of knowledge is an 
employer sufficiently on notice about a religious practice, and once 
that notice is triggered, even if the employer does not have complete 
knowledge, does the employer have a duty to inquire further?  Before 
the Supreme Court weighed in, several circuit courts addressed this 
question.97  While certain courts—especially the Tenth Circuit in 
Abercrombie—called for complete, particularized, and actual knowledge 
of the conflict, others argued that some knowledge of the conflict 
constitutes notice and thus triggers the duty to accommodate.98  The 
EEOC and Abercrombie used the lower courts’ knowledge standards as 
starting points for their positions; however, even more telling of the 
complicated and nuanced “knowledge” and “notice” issues is that the 
Supreme Court rejected all of the lower courts’ decisions and created 







 95  EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(2). 
 96  Dixon, 627 F.3d at 855–56 (explaining that employer can become aware of 
tension even if employee does not expressly object to a work requirement based on 
her religion); Brown v. Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
employer only needs to have enough information to understand that there is conflict 
between employee’s religious practices and employer’s job requirements); Hellinger 
v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding that employer’s 
knowledge of employee’s refusal to sell condoms at a prior job due to religious beliefs 
was sufficient).   
 97  See, e.g., Nobach v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 762 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 
2014); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 98  See discussion infra Part III.A–C (discussing the circuit split on the notice 
standard).  
 99  See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the Supreme Court’s motive standard). 
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III. THE KNOWLEDGE STANDARDS AMONG THE CIRCUITS AND THE 
EEOC 
Bringing a Title VII claim is complex and multifaceted.  Because 
conflicts between work and religion are common, a need exists for an 
approach that would permit a nuanced inquiry into highly fact-
sensitive religious discrimination claims.  To understand why the 
Supreme Court in Abercrombie created an entirely new shield against 
religious bias, one must begin at the lower courts’ decisions and 
understand the levels of knowledge that provided sufficient notice, 
depending on the jurisdiction. 
This section uses the Tenth Circuit’s Abercrombie decision as a 
starting point to analyze the three approaches of the circuits, as well as 
the EEOC, that have weighed in on this issue.  First, this section 
highlights the Tenth Circuit’s particularized, actual knowledge 
standard.  Then, it discusses the courts representing the majority 
view—the express notice standard.  Finally, it discusses the cases 
representing the EEOC’s view—the flexible notice standard. 
A. “Particularized and Actual Knowledge” in the Tenth Circuit’s 
Abercrombie Decision: The Command and Control View of Religious 
Accommodation100 
One of the most noteworthy reasonable accommodation cases is 
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., in which the Tenth Circuit held 
that an applicant or employee must establish that she initially informed 
the employer that she engaged in a particular practice for religious 
reasons and needed an accommodation for that practice due to a 
conflict between her religious practice and the company’s dress 
policy.101  The court found that the retailer’s failure to hire the 
applicant, Ms. Elauf, was not an act of religious discrimination since 
she never informed the company prior to its hiring decision that she 
wore a hijab for religious reasons and thus, notice was lacking.102  
Unlike the other circuit courts adopting an express notice standard, 
however, the Abercrombie court set an even higher bar for express 
notice, holding that only the employer’s particularized, actual knowledge 
of the key facts would meet the notice requirement that triggers the 
 
 100  See Charles Sullivan, Triggering the Duty of Accommodating Religion, WORKPLACE 
PROF. BLOG (Oct. 20, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/ 
2013/10/a-similar-problem-arises-with-respect-tothe-duty-to-accommodate-two-
recent-contrasting-opinions-from-the-samecircuit-indicat.html.  
 101  Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1131–33. 
 102  Id. at 1110–11. 
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employer’s duty to accommodate the applicant.103  Put another way, an 
employer can be liable under Title VII for failing to accommodate an 
employee based on a “religious observance or practice” only if the 
employer has actual knowledge that the applicant or employee needs an 
accommodation for it (because the practice is an inflexible one), and 
the employer’s actual knowledge resulted from direct, explicit notice 
from the applicant or employee.104  The Tenth Circuit further 
explained that the employer should not be held liable for failure to 
have “guessed, surmised, or figured out from the surrounding 
circumstances” that the practice was religiously-based and required 
accommodation, which means that under the express notice standard, 
the employee or applicant must always raise the need for an 
accommodation.105  So, in the Abercrombie case, even though the hiring 
manager may have thought there was a conflict between the plaintiff’s 
religious observance and the store’s rules, she lacked actual knowledge 
of the conflict.  Most notably, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Elauf’s 
situation from the other significant cases in the flexible notice 
jurisdictions by reasoning that, even if notice was not sufficient in those 
cases, there was some notice.106 
Creating an even higher standard, the Tenth Circuit contended 
that even “actual knowledge” of the religious nature of 
“a particular applicant or employee” is not enough to trigger the duty 
to accommodate: 
That is because the applicant or employee may not 
actually need an accommodation.  In other words, an 
applicant or employee may not consider his or her religious 
practice to be inflexible; that is, he or she may not feel 
obliged by religion to adhere to the practice.  If that is the 
situation, then there actually is no conflict, nor a consequent 
need for the employer to provide a reasonable 
accommodation.107 
In other words, until an employee claims to need an accommodation, 
an employer has no obligation to inquire even if the employer was 
“generally aware of the beliefs and observances traditionally associated 
with a particular religious group, and also knew that the applicant or 
employee displayed symbols associated with that group—or even that 
the applicant or employee specifically claimed to be a member of that 
 
 103  Id.  
 104  Id. at 1128.  
 105  Id. at 1127–28.   
 106  Id. at 1126 (“[T]here is no doubt that these cases settled for nothing less than 
some significant measure of particularized, actual knowledge.”).  
 107  Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1133–34.  
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group.”108  Such a scenario could arise when the person does not 
consider his or her religious practice to be inflexible and may not feel 
obliged by religion to adhere to the practice.  Accordingly, there would 
not be any conflict triggering the employer’s duty to accommodate.109  
Thus, even actual knowledge may not trigger notice and the duty to 
accommodate. 
The court’s strict approach favored the policy goal of limiting 
liability for the employer.  By adopting the express notice standard and 
specifying a minimum requirement of particularized, actual 
knowledge, the court placed the full burden on the employee, which 
prevents the employer from having to guess or surmise from the 
circumstances that a particular practice is based on religion and that 
the plaintiff requires an accommodation for it.110  It also encourages 
employers to refrain from inquiring into the religious affiliation of a 
prospective or current employee. 
Actual knowledge is an extreme standard, especially in cases 
arising out of an interview setting and in those with an undisclosed 
workplace policy.  In those situations, the applicant or employee will 
not learn about the work requirement and possible conflict unless the 
employer tells them, or, as in the Abercrombie case, could be misled to 
believe that there was no conflict at all.  If the employer is the only 
party in a position to know whether a conflict exists, it would be 
blatantly unfair to place the burden on the applicant to detect and 
express the conflict. 
B. Express Notice Standard 
A variation on the express notice problem occurs when an 
employee informs a coworker, but not a direct supervisor of her 
beliefs.111  In Nobach v. Woodland Village Nursing Center, the nursing 
center fired an employee after she refused to pray the rosary with a 
patient because it conflicted with her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s 
Witness.112  The court held there was no evidence that the employee 
ever advised anyone involved in her discharge that praying the rosary 
was against her religion.113  The employee acknowledged that the only 
time she made any mention of her religious beliefs was to a certified 
 
 108  Id. at 1132. 
 109  Id. at 1133–34.  
 110  Id. at 1127.  
 111  See Nobach v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 762 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2014).  
 112  Id. at 444, 445.  
 113  Id. at 444.  
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nurse’s assistant (CNA), a non-supervisory employee, but the employee 
never claimed that the CNA told anyone of her reason for refusing to 
aid the resident.114  The court further stated that the first time the 
employee actually informed her supervisor that she refused to perform 
her job duty due to her religious beliefs was following her discharge 
for insubordination.  Therefore, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit’s holding expands on the Tenth Circuit’s holding, 
maintaining that employees must convey their requests directly to their 
supervisors or the management, not coworkers, to satisfy the notice 
element. 
Both the United States Court of Appeals for the Third and Fourth 
Circuits addressed situations where an employer had some knowledge 
of the employee’s beliefs, but decided that that knowledge was not 
sufficient to “put it on notice.”  In Wilkerson v. New Media Technology 
Charter School, Inc., the Third Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s religious 
accommodation claim because she failed to inform her employer of 
her need for an accommodation due to a conflict between her 
Christian beliefs and the employer’s “libations” or alcohol-drinking 
ceremony.115  The court reasoned that the fact that the employer “knew 
she was a Christian does not sufficiently satisfy [the plaintiff’s] duty to 
provide ‘fair warning’ to [the employer] that she possessed a religious 
belief that specifically prevented her from participating in the libations 
ceremony.”116  Even if an employer “suspected” that the libations 
ceremony would be offensive to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would still 
have an obligation to “inform the defendants that the libation 
ceremony would offend her religious beliefs.”117 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found that the employer’s 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s strongly-held religious beliefs was not 
enough to “put it on notice” that those beliefs would compel her to 
“write, and send, personal, accusatory letters to co-workers at their 
homes.”118  Even if an employer were on notice that an applicant or 
employee subscribed to a particular religious belief system, that 
 
 114  Id.  
 115  Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 
2008).  The court does not describe the libations ceremony in its opinion, but an 
article describes it as “an African-American ritual where liquid (water or alcohol) is 
poured in the four directions of the compass, while the names of the deceased are 
read aloud.”  Id. at 317 n.1; Paul Mollica, Wilkerson v. New Media Technology Charter 
School, OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP BLOG (Apr. 8, 2008), 
http://www.employmentlawblog.info/2008/04/wilkerson-v-new-media-technology-
charter-school-no-07-1305-3d-cir-apr-9-2008.shtml.  
 116  Wilkerson, 522 F.3d at 319. 
 117  Id. at 319–20.  
 118  Chalmers v. Tulon Co., 101 F.3d 1012, 1020 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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information would not be enough to tell the employer what practices 
are religious in “the person’s own scheme of things.”119  This is because 
religion is a uniquely personal matter.  Ordinarily, the only way the 
employer would know such information is if the applicant or employee 
informed the employer. 
C. Some Knowledge from Some Other Source: The Flexible Notice 
Approach Requiring a Case-by-Case Analysis 
Other circuits, along with the EEOC and Judge Ebe’s dissent in 
Abercrombie, asserted that notice can derive from knowledge by the 
applicant or some other source, and that it need not be an affirmative 
statement.  According to the EEOC guidelines, no “magic language” is 
necessary to constitute notice; the only requirement is that the request 
alerts the employer to the fact that it is motivated by a religious belief.120  
That notice to the employer then triggers a need for the employer to 
obtain more knowledge of the employee’s specific religious beliefs and 
accommodation.121  Usually, this means that an employer will have a 
dialogue with the employee and inquire into the employee’s beliefs 
and practices.  Thus, the EEOC urged a less restrictive approach, 
emphasizing that notice need not be strictly in the form of an 
employee or applicant verbally requesting an accommodation.  More 
specifically, the EEOC reasoned: “The employer’s obligation is to 
attempt reasonable accommodation (where no undue hardship would 
result) when it has notice—be it from an affirmative statement by the 
individual, or some other source—of an individual’s religious belief that 
conflicts with a work requirement.”122  So, in the Tenth Circuit 
Abercrombie case, although Abercrombie is required to receive notice 
 
 119  EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1) (emphasis added); see also 
LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1119 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a Seventh Day 
Adventist prisoner’s religious belief that he must adhere to a vegetarian diet, if 
sincerely held, was entitled to protection under the First Amendment even though the 
district court found that not all Seventh Day Adventists are vegetarian and that the 
“faith does not require” such a diet).   
 120  Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450–51 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that employee’s request for leave to travel to Nigeria and participate in a 
“funeral ceremony” or “funeral rite” involving animal sacrifice “so that death will not 
come or take away any of the children’s life” [sic] was enough to put create a genuine 
issue of material fact whether the employer was on notice that the request for 
accommodation was religious); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(1).  
 121  Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 450–51. 
 122  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Response Brief of Appellee U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission at 41, E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (No. 11-5110)).   
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that Elauf needed an accommodation, the knowledge could come 
from Elauf’s religious clothing attire instead of a verbal statement. 
In the same vein, Judge Ebel in his Tenth Circuit dissent 
advocated for the flexible notice standard, reasoning that under 
certain circumstances, it makes “no sense” to require the plaintiff to 
show first that she informed the company that her religious practice 
conflicts with the company policy.123  Judge Ebel relied on the principle 
adopted by other circuits—including the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Brown—and also adopted by the 
EEOC and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in making his 
decision.124  Specifically, Judge Ebel objected to the majority’s 
requirement that a “job applicant must initiate a general discussion of 
her religious beliefs during the job interview just in case her religious 
beliefs and practices might conflict with some unstated policy or work 
rule of the employer.”125  The judge suggested that in situations where 
there is an undisclosed workplace policy, it should not be the employee’s 
burden to initiate the discussion, but rather the employer’s duty to 
initiate a dialogue.126  Practically, the employer should inform the 
applicant of the work policy and then inquire into whether the 
applicant could comply with that policy or whether the company 
“could accommodate her belief in some reasonable way.”127  Under the 
dissent’s approach, this inquiry would have been sufficient to initiate 
any dialogue between the job applicant, Ms. Elauf, and the employer, 
Abercrombie, as to whether Ms. Elauf had religious beliefs that 
conflicted with Abercrombie’s dress code. 
Judge Ebel then combined two evidentiary elements to show how 
the EEOC established its prima facie case.  Those two elements—that 
Elauf was not aware of Abercrombie’s conflicting policy and that 
Abercrombie had knowledge that Elauf might hold religious beliefs 
that conflicted with its Look Policy—”smack of exactly the religious 
discrimination that Title VII prohibits.”128  Abercrombie, Judge Ebel 
argued, was able to avoid any dialogue regarding a reasonable 
accommodation by failing to disclose the possible conflict and then 
refusing to hire Elauf.129  Therefore, according to Judge Ebel, the 
 
 123  Id. at 1143–44 (Ebel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 124  Id. at 1147–50.  
 125  Id. at 1150. 
 126  Id. at 1150–51.  
 127  Id. at 1151.   
 128  Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1150 (Ebel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).   
 129  Id.  
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EEOC established a prima facie case of a failure-to-accommodate 
claim.130 
Providing an entirely different framework for the Abercrombie case, 
Judge Ebel described how the circumstances in the case “justif[ied] 
applying . . . a common sense exception to the usual rule,” and 
advocated for a known or should have known standard.131  Judge Ebel 
referenced a Ninth Circuit decision involving the ADA and 
recognizing an exception to the general rule that an employee request 
an accommodation where the employer knows, or has reason to know, 
that a disability prevents an employee from requesting an 
accommodation.132  Judge Ebel stated: “There are, then, exceptions to 
the general rule that an employer’s obligation to consider a reasonable 
accommodation is not triggered unless and until an employee or job 
applicant informs the employer of the need for an accommodation.”133 
This standard—the known or should have known standard—as 
proposed by Judge Ebel is a more forgiving and flexible approach to 
those employees or applicants who are in no position to have 
knowledge of a conflict.  The standard also ensures that those persons 
receive the Title VII protection in a wide range of situations—
including knowledge from some source other than the applicant or 
employee and the employer’s own observations.  Essentially, if the 
employer should have known of the conflict, then the employer is on 
notice. 
Similarly, the Seventh, Ninth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
explicitly rejected the express notice standard and have found notice 
established by actions that signaled an employer’s awareness of a 
religious conflict.134  The courts all adopted the same standard, 
reasoning that “[a]n employer need have only enough information 
about an employee’s religious needs to permit the employer to 
understand the existence of a conflict between the employee’s 
religious practices and the employer’s job requirements.”135  For 
example, in Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined whether an 
 
 130  Id.   
 131  Id. at 1148.  
 132  Id. (citing Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
 133  Id.  
 134  See Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 855–56 (11th Cir. 2010); Brown v. 
Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995); Heller v. Ebb Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1439 
(9th Cir. 1993). 
 135  Dixon, 627 F.3d at 855–56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations 
omitted); see also Brown, 61 F.3d at 654; Heller, 8 F.3d at 1439. 
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employee sufficiently notified his employer of the religious character 
of his request to attend his father’s funeral in Africa.136  The employee’s 
two written requests contained language referring to a “funeral 
ceremony,” a “funeral rite,” and “animal sacrifice” and described his 
participation as “compulsory,” with the spiritual consequence of his 
absence being his own and family members’ deaths.137  Because the 
plaintiff’s written requests provided notice, the court’s analysis 
centered on whether such notice was sufficient for the employer to 
know that the request was based on a religious belief.  Although the 
plaintiff’s religious beliefs and practices were not “as familiar as 
[others] closer to the modern American mainstream,” the court held 
that the plaintiff’s request for leave to attend his father’s funeral gave 
rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether such a request 
provided sufficient notice of its religious nature.138  The Adeyeye court 
emphasized that “Title VII has not been interpreted to require 
adherence to a rigid script to satisfy the notice requirement,” and in 
fact, the court should “construe [Title VII] liberally in favor of 
employee protection.” 139  In particular, the court underscored that “an 
‘employer cannot shield itself from liability . . . by intentionally 
remaining in the dark’” regarding a person’s need for reasonable 
accommodation.140  Therefore, while the employee should give fair 
notice of the need for an accommodation, the employer is free to seek 
clarification regarding an ambiguous request.141  
In Heller, a Jewish employee was fired for missing work to attend 
his wife’s conversion ceremony.142  While the employee had asked to 
attend the ceremony, the employer argued that “because Heller never 
explained the nature of the ceremony to [the employer], he did not 
give notice of his conflict.”143  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, explaining 
that plaintiff’s supervisor “knew” that he was Jewish, “knew” that his 
“wife was studying for conversion,” and “when [the plaintiff] requested 
the time off, he informed the [supervisor] why he needed to miss 
 
 136  See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 451–52 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 137  Id. at 450–51 (emphasis added). 
 138  Id. at 447, 451. 
 139  Id. at 450.  
 140  Id. (quoting Xodus v. Wackenhut Corp., 619 F.3d 683, 686 (7th Cir. 2010)).   
 141  Id.   
 142  Heller v. Ebb Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993).  The Heller court also 
makes the argument that Title VII encompasses all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, even those that are not specifically required by the religion.  Id. at 1438.  
Therefore, although attending the conversion ceremony was not specifically required, 
it was still protected conduct under Title VII.  Id. at 1438–39. 
 143  Id. at 1439. 
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work.”144  Thus, the court held that no specific explanation was 
required, reasoning that “[a] sensible approach would require only 
enough information about an employee’s religious needs to permit the 
employer to understand the existence of a conflict between the 
employee’s religious practices and the employer’s job requirements.”145 
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the express notice standard.146  
In Brown v. Polk County, the employer reprimanded the employee for 
engaging in religious activities at work, such as referring to Bible 
passages and using office space for group prayers.147  The employer 
terminated the employee based, in part, on the reprimand.148  The 
court found sufficient notice because the employer’s conduct 
demonstrated its awareness of a religious conflict.149  For instance, the 
employer issued a reprimand that “related directly to religious 
activities by Mr. Brown,” which established that the employer was “well 
aware of the potential for conflict between [its] expectations and Mr. 
Brown’s religious activities.”150 
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, in Dixon v. Hallmark 
Cos., rejected the explicit-notice defense raised by the employer, 
concluding that it was not fatal to a couple’s Title VII claims that they 
“never expressly told [their supervisor] that they did not want to take 
down their artwork because they opposed efforts to remove God from 
public places.”151  The court found this notice requirement satisfied by 
conduct showing that the employer had in fact received enough 
information to be aware of a conflict.152  
These courts of appeals do not demand that notice come from 
the employee’s explicit verbal statements giving rise to “actual, 
particularized knowledge” on the part of the employer.  The prima 
facie notice requirement in the flexible notice jurisdiction should be 
flexibly interpreted when the facts indicate that notice of an 
individual’s religious beliefs was provided by some means other than 
the individual affirmatively “informing” the employer of the belief.  As 
noted supra, three courts of appeals have held that an employer needs 
to have “only enough information . . . to permit the employer to 
 
 144  Id.  
 145  Id.  
 146  See Brown v. Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995).  
 147  Id. at 652.  
 148  Id. at 652–53.  
 149  Id. at 654. 
 150  Id.  
 151  Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir. 2010).  
 152  Id. at 855–56. 
WEISS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2016  1:04 PM 
2016] COMMENT 1139 
understand the existence of a conflict,” without regard to the 
employer’s actual understanding.153  A fourth court—the Adeyeye 
court—has likewise held that an employer can be liable under Title VII 
regardless of whether it actually concludes that a conflict exists. 
D. Three Notice Scenarios 
To better understand the lower courts’ notice standards, it may 
be helpful to consider the cases in light of the positions of the 
employee and employer with regard to knowledge of the conflict.  
These cases can be categorized into three possible situations. 
Scenario one: An employee knows there could be a conflict but 
the employer does not know there could be a conflict.  In this scenario, 
since the employee is the one with the actual knowledge of her 
religious belief and the conflict at the workplace, the onus falls on the 
employee to request an accommodation.  This is the situation in many 
employment discrimination cases like in Adeyeye; however, in Adeyeye, 
the problem arose after the employee made the request, and the 
inquiry was whether the employee’s request was based on a religious 
need and if the employer knew that it was a religious request.154  Since 
the court reasoned that the request itself did not have to explicitly state 
“Title VII” or “religious accommodation,” this category also warrants 
an inquiry into “how much” notice constitutes adequate notice. 
Scenario two: Neither the employee nor the employer knows of 
the conflict.  The employer will be aware of its work rules and the 
applicant will know her religious beliefs, but neither side will inform 
the other of these matters during the course of the job interview or 
work period.  Under such circumstances, no dialogue will occur 
between the job applicant and the employer as to this unidentified 
conflict, through no fault of either party.  In that scenario, in the event 
of a hire, the employer would not be liable for failure to accommodate 
until the conflict actually arises. 
Scenario three: An employee does not know about the conflict 
between her belief and the employer’s workplace practice while an 
employer might know of the conflict.  This is the situation that arose in 
Abercrombie, where testimony from the employee applicant shows she 
was completely unaware of any conflict, whereas the employer’s 
testimony highlighted its suspicions of the employee’s practice and 
 
 153  Heller v. Ebb Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Dixon v. 
Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 855 (11th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 
654 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 154  See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450–51 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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correctly assumed it existed based on her religious beliefs.155  In this 
scenario, an employer is then in a better position to determine 
whether the employee’s attire is likely to create a conflict in the 
employer’s own workplace. 
These three scenarios highlight that, by virtue of the applicant’s 
or employee’s position, she may never acquire knowledge of the 
conflict, and conversely, by virtue of the employer’s position, it may 
never acquire knowledge of the conflict, in which case there cannot be 
a problem.  Moreover, because there are situations in which the 
applicant or employee may never be aware of the conflict, the burden 
should not automatically fall on the applicant or employee to initiate 
the dialogue with the employer. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION 
CLAIMS 
“This is really easy,” Justice Scalia stated from the bench before 
announcing the 8-1 opinion in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 
finding in favor of the EEOC;156 however, since that ruling, employers 
and employees alike have been questioning the “simplicity” of the 
opinion.  Instead of clarifying the “knowledge” and “notice” standards 
previously articulated by the lower courts, the Court seemed to do away 
with a knowledge standard altogether and applied a new legal 
approach: motive, not knowledge, is the deciding factor in a Title VII 
religious accommodation claim.157  The concurrence expressed 
concerns that to determine any motive, knowledge is still required, and 
furthermore, under Justice Scalia’s interpretation, Title VII could be 
used to hold an employer liable without fault.158  And in his dissent, 
Justice Thomas criticized the majority for its Title VII interpretation 
that an employer implementing a neutral workplace policy could 
engage in intentional discrimination.  Here, the EEOC’s claim is a 
disparate impact issue; as a result, it reasoned Abercrombie’s Look 
Policy was neutral, and Abercrombie did not discriminate against 
Elauf.159  With three new approaches to the knowledge-and-notice 
issue, the Supreme Court delivered a more complicated opinion than 
 
 155  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1147–48  (10th Cir. 
2013) (Ebel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 156  Adam Liptak, Muslim Woman Denied Job over Head Scarf Wins in Supreme Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/us/supreme-court-
rules-in-samantha-elauf-abercrombie-fitch-case.html.  
 157  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015). 
 158  Id. at 2035–36 (Alito, J., concurring in part).  
 159  Id. at 2038 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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originally thought. 
A. The Majority’s Decision: Motive, Not Knowledge, is the Deciding 
Factor 
The Supreme Court ruled that an employer is not required to 
have actual knowledge of a person’s religious practice to violate Title 
VII if an employer refuses to make an accommodation for that person 
(i.e., an adverse employment action) with an illegal motive related to 
religious practice.160  Justice Scalia highlighted that the statutory 
language of Title VII does not impose a knowledge requirement, 
unlike other antidiscrimination statutes; instead, he concluded that 
“the intentional discrimination provision” of Title VII “prohibits 
certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.”161  In 
other words, “[m]otive and knowledge are separate concepts.”162  
Justice Scalia imagined a situation where an employer has actual 
knowledge of an applicant’s need for an accommodation, but that 
employer’s refusal to hire the applicant may not be motivated by any 
desire to avoid an accommodation.  Therefore, he argued, the 
converse is true, as well: an employer who acts with motive to avoid an 
accommodation may violate Title VII even where the employer has an 
“unsubstantiated suspicion.”163  Such a scenario is consistent with what 
occurred in Abercrombie, where the hiring manager avoided asking 
questions about any accommodations despite having a “suspicion” that 
Elauf wore a headscarf for religious reasons.  According to Justice 
Scalia: “[T]he rule for disparate-treatment claims based on a failure to 
accommodate a religious practice is straightforward: An employer may 
not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a 
factor in employment decisions.”164  Thus, when a refusal to hire is 
based on at least a “suspicion” or a “hunch” that a worker follows a 
religious practice and wants to keep doing so, even if contrary to 
company policy, an employer may be found liable for a Title VII 
violation.165  Such a result, despite Abercrombie’s objections, takes the 
burden off applicants by finding that a job applicant has no affirmative 
obligation to inform her potential employer of a religious conflict.166 
 
 
 160  Id. at 2032.  
 161  Id. at 2032–33 (emphasis added).  
 162  Id. at 2033. 
 163  Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033.  
 164  Id.  
 165  See id. 
 166  See id.  
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What the opinion does not clarify, however, is how an applicant 
will demonstrate motive, given that a “hunch”—although less 
immeasurable and more intuitive—still requires thought or some form 
of “knowledge.”  The Court reasoned it would be easier to infer motive 
where an applicant does make an accommodation request or an 
employer is certain that a particular religious practice exists, but such 
proofs are not necessary to establish liability.167  In practice, this means 
that if an applicant requests an exception to a “Look Policy” because 
of her practice of wearing a hijab and an employer denies her request, 
such a denial would be sufficient to establish motive; however, such 
direct proof would not be necessary.  Rather, if an employer “suspects” 
the headscarf is a hijab worn for religious purposes but avoids any 
conversation regarding accommodation, it may still have sufficient 
motive.  But what happens in the case where the employer does not 
even suspect that the headscarf is worn for religious reasons?  Can that 
employer be found liable?  Justice Scalia considered this concern in a 
footnote: 
While a knowledge requirement cannot be added to the 
motive requirement, it is arguable that the motive 
requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least suspects 
that the practice in question is a religious practice—i.e., that he 
cannot discriminate “because of” a “religious practice” unless 
he knows or suspects it to be a religious practice.  That issue 
is not presented in this case, since Abercrombie knew—or at 
least suspected—that the scarf was worn for religious reasons.  
The question has therefore not been discussed by either side, 
in brief or oral argument.  It seems to us inappropriate to 
resolve this unargued point by way of dictum, as the 
concurrence would do.168 
With this footnote, Justice Scalia declined to answer whether motive 
can be met without a showing that the employer “at least suspects that 
the practice in question is a religious practice.”169  It is undisputed that 
Abercrombie at least suspected that Elauf wore the hijab for religious 
reasons, as it is clear from the evidence that the hiring manager asked 
her supervisor about the head covering.  From Justice Scalia’s 
statement, one understands that at minimum, suspicion is necessary to 
establish motive for liability purposes.  Such a claim, however, raises 
the question: how does one measure “suspicion” without considering 
what the employer “knew” at the time of hiring?  Justice Alito, critical 
 
 167  Id.  
 168  Id. at 2033 n.3 (emphasis added). 
 169  Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033 n.3. 
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of the majority’s “no-knowledge” standard, addressed this point in his 
concurrence. 
B. The Concurrence: Knowledge is Still Relevant 
It would “be very strange,” Justice Alito stated, if Title VII did not 
impose a knowledge requirement.170  According to Justice Alito, under 
the “no-knowledge” standard, the Court fails to answer the question of 
what level of “suspicion” is necessary to find the prohibited motive in 
an employer’s hiring decision.  As a result, an employer is essentially 
strictly liable for failing to accommodate a practice that an employer 
has no idea is religious in nature.171  Therefore, Justice Alito maintains 
that Title VII has a knowledge requirement and that as a result, if 
Abercrombie truly had no knowledge of Elauf’s religious needs, it 
could avoid liability.  He proffers that an underlying purpose of the 
Title VII discrimination statute is to require employers to engage in an 
interactive process with applicants and employees to consider whether 
their adherence to religious practices could be accommodated in light 
of a workplace policy without undue hardship.172  Asserting a strict 
liability standard would “deprive employers” of the opportunity to 
engage in such an interactive process.173 
To further clarify his knowledge standard, Justice Alito explained 
that it is still unnecessary for a plaintiff to show that an employer 
engaged in an adverse employment action because of the religious 
nature of the practice.  An employer may be liable, for instance, where 
it institutes a policy to “reject[] all applicants who refuse to work on 
Saturday, whether for religious or nonreligious reasons,” but 
nevertheless knows that one applicant’s refusal to work on Saturday is 
based on religious practices.174  In other words, even with a neutral 
workplace policy, an employer must engage in the interactive 
accommodation process with an applicant who cannot comply because 
of religious reasons.  Justice Alito based his reasoning on the existence 
of the “undue hardship” defense, claiming that the very purpose of this 
defense is to shield an employer from liability for refusing to make an 
exception to a neutral work rule if it can prove undue hardship.175 
In his final point, Justice Alito criticizes the Court’s interpretation 
of the plaintiff’s burden in a reasonable accommodation claim.  While 
 
 170  Id. at 2035 (Alito, J., concurring in part).   
 171  See id. at 2036. 
 172  Id.  
 173  Id.  
 174  Id.  
 175  Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2036 (Alito, J., concurring in part). 
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the Court asserts that it is the “plaintiff’s burden” to prove the failure-
to-accommodate claim, Justice Alito argues that a plaintiff need only 
prove that an employer (1) failed or refused to hire an individual (2) 
because of (3) any aspect of the individual’s practice—elements which 
“make no mention of accommodation.”176  An employer, therefore, 
bears the burden of production and persuasion if and when it asserts 
the undue hardship defense.  As a result, the plaintiff need not show 
that the employer was motivated or was attempting to avoid making an 
accommodation, but once a plaintiff demonstrates that the employer 
failed to hire because of a plaintiff’s religious practice, then the 
employer must assert and prove the undue hardship defense.177  Such 
a clarification of the parties’ burdens, Justice Alito believes, may make 
a difference in close cases.178 
C. The Dissent: Against the “Disparate-Treatment-Based-on-Equal-
Treatment Claim” 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas found that the majority’s 
interpretation created “an entirely new form of liability: the disparate-
treatment-based-on-equal-treatment claim.”179  He upheld the 
“undisputed proposition” that application of a neutral policy could not 
constitute “intentional discrimination;” as a result, because 
Abercrombie’s Look Policy was neutral, Abercrombie did not 
discriminate against Elauf.180  Furthermore, Justice Thomas argued 
that the majority’s interpretation of Title VII was too broad, specifically 
criticizing the interpretation of the phrase, “because of such 
individual’s religious practice.”181  He argued that the majority’s 
“because of” reading includes scenarios in which an employer has a 
neutral workplace policy and an employee’s practice “happens” to be 
religious.182  This reading would “punish employers who have no 
discriminatory motive” in instituting the practice, and such a “strict 
liability” reading, he argued, is “at odds with intentional 
discrimination.”183 
 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id.  
 178  Id.  
 179  Id. at 2041 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 180  Id. at 2037.   
 181  See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2038–39 (Alito, J., concurring in part). 
 182  Id. at 2039. 
 183  Id. at 2038–39. 
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V. THE AFTERMATH OF ABERCROMBIE 
After the opinion was handed down, the parties quickly settled.  
Abercrombie paid $25,670 in damages to Elauf and $18,983 in court 
costs.184  While Elauf received only a small settlement, the Abercrombie 
ruling resulted in a great expansion of workplace religious 
accommodation.  By eliminating “religious accommodation” as a 
freestanding claim and relaxing the “because of” standard, the Court 
afforded employees and applicants an easier way to prove motive in 
hiring decisions. 
A. Religious Discrimination or Accommodation?: How Eliminating the 
Distinction Influenced the Majority’s Decision 
It is possible that the knowledge and notice discussion could have 
been avoided altogether if the parties and courts had taken another 
approach from the outset.  Professor Charles Sullivan considers: “The 
apparent circuit split on what is necessary to trigger the duty to 
accommodate needs to be resolved, but one good start would be to 
stop viewing all religious discrimination cases through an 
accommodation lens.”185  He posits that the Tenth Circuit’s Abercrombie 
decision might have had a different outcome if litigated as a 
straightforward case of discrimination against Muslims.  Suppose Elauf 
would have been willing to forgo wearing a hair covering.  The store 
would then have turned her down because of her religion when, in fact, 
her religion was no obstacle to employment.  This result then becomes 
a per se discrimination claim.  Even so, an employer could still claim 
another defense, such as the bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ), arguing that it is allowed to consider certain attributions 
when making hiring decisions because they are necessary to the 
profession.186 Professor Sullivan suggests: “In that case, the focus would 
be how critical the Look Policy was to Abercrombie and whether some 
exceptions might co-exist with it.  Not that such an inquiry might not 
have its own complications: hijab yes, burka, no?”187 
Professor Sullivan’s assessment foreshadows an interesting series 
of events: in a similar line of thinking, the EEOC switched its theory 
from religious accommodation to an intentional discrimination claim 
 
 184  Press Release, EEOC, Abercrombie Resolves Religious Discrimination Case 
Following Supreme Court Ruling in Favor of EEOC (July 28, 2015), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-28-15.cfm.  
 185  Sullivan, supra note 100. 
 186  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2014). 
 187  Sullivan, supra note 100.  
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right before oral argument at the Supreme Court.188  And the Court 
agreed.  In an unexpected analysis, the Court corrected lower courts’ 
and the EEOC’s previous assumptions that religious accommodation 
was a freestanding claim.  Going forward, lower courts should refrain 
from analyzing reasonable accommodation claims in a vacuum.  The 
Court’s clarification of the law most likely had the biggest impact on 
the Abercrombie decision.  Analyzing the EEOC’s accommodation claim 
in Abercrombie as a straightforward disparate treatment claim warranted 
a direct analysis of the “because of” standard in the Title VII. 
In its ruling, the Court relaxed the “because of” statutory language 
of Title VII disparate treatment claims.  Title VII provides that it is 
unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire “because of” a religious 
practice.  To show that the employer took an adverse employment 
action, the applicant need only show that her religious practice was a 
“motivating factor” in the action.  It is irrelevant whether the employer 
knew that there would be a conflict between the employee’s religious 
beliefs and a job duty.  It is also irrelevant whether the employer knew 
about the employee’s religious beliefs.  What matters in a Title VII is 
what motivated the employer’s decision. 
B. Applying the Suspicion Standard Below 
In light of Abercrombie’s lowered “because of” standard, the Fifth 
Circuit considered Nobach on a second appeal.189  As previously stated, 
Nobach involved a nursing home activities aide who was fired after she 
refused to pray the rosary with a patient because it conflicted with her 
religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness.190  Using the Supreme Court’s 
analysis, the court still ruled in favor of the nursing home as a matter 
of law, but this time on per se discrimination grounds.  Although the 
nursing home admitted that Nobach’s refusal to pray the Rosary was a 
factor in her discharge, the court found no evidence that anyone 
involved in the termination suspected Nobach’s refusal was “because 
of” her religious practice.191  When the nursing home director fired 
Nobach, she told Nobach: “I don’t care if it’s your fifth write-up or not.  
I would have fired you for this instance alone.”192  Nobach—for the first 
 
 188  See Brief for Petitioner at 19, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2028 (2015) (No. 14-86).  
 189  Nobach v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 799 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 190  Id. at 375.  
 191  Id. at 378–79.  
 192  Nobach v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 762 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2014), 
vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2803 (2015). 
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time—then informed the director that performing the Rosary was 
against her religion, stating: “Well, I can’t pray the Rosary.  It’s against 
my religion.”193  The director’s response was: “I don’t care if it is against 
your religion or not.  If you don’t do it, it’s insubordination.”194  Had 
this conversation taken place before her discharge, Nobach may have been 
able to argue that Woodland had a “certainty that the practice 
exist[ed]” and therefore it would have been “easier to infer motive.”195  
Even though Nobach framed the claim as intentional discrimination, 
Nobach was unable to proffer evidence that the director fired her as a 
direct result of her religious beliefs. 
What is disconcerting about the Fifth Circuit’s outcome, however, 
is that the nursing home admits that Nobach’s refusal to pray the 
Rosary was a factor in its firing decision.  It is hard to believe that 
during the firing process, the employer did not question Nobach’s 
refusal to pray the Rosary, given that such a request involves a highly 
religious practice.  Although a conversation took place after the fact, 
such a scenario highlights the importance of communication among 
employees and employers.  While Woodland may have escaped 
liability, it did so merely based on the timeline of its decision.  
Although “insubordination” is a valid reason for any termination, 
situations like that in Nobach deserve further consideration by 
employers who may make rash decisions without any dialogue. 
VI. THAT’S A WRAP!: WHAT THIS DECISION MEANS FOR EMPLOYERS 
GOING FORWARD 
Communication is key in any employment context.  Not only is it 
important, but it is now also necessary for both sides to establish a 
rapport and open lines of communication, beginning with the 
interview process.  It is fair to ask employers to institute a formal 
process through which they can disclose workplace policy conflicts that 
could interfere with an employee’s or applicant’s religious practices.  
And given the new ruling that prohibits employers from making an 
applicant’s religious practice a factor in an employment decision, it is 
highly recommended that employers move quickly to establish new 
policies if they are not already in place. 
There are many practical ways that employers can institute 
procedures to better inform their future and current employees of a 
position’s essential requirements and ask if any accommodations are 
 
 193  Id.  
 194  Id.  
 195  See Nobach, 799 F.3d at 379 (quoting EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015)). 
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necessary.  For instance, in this technological age where many job 
applications are submitted online, an employer can include a manual 
of its workplace policies with its application.  It could add a statement 
on its application about being an equal opportunity employer and a 
clause regarding reasonable accommodation.  It could read: 
“Employees who believe that they are entitled to a reasonable 
accommodation of our workplace policies due to religious beliefs, 
practices, or other grounds protected by relevant law should discuss 
the matter with their supervisor or hiring manager.  Such 
accommodations will be granted unless they pose an undue burden on 
the employer.”  And during the interview process, an employer could 
arguably make a statement such as: “It is our obligation as an employer 
to implement equal employment opportunities and refrain from 
discrimination based on race, religion, or gender.  These are our 
policies (insert dress/grooming or scheduling policies).  Would you 
need an accommodation for said policies?”  This dialogue would 
provide an applicant or employee the opportunity to vocalize an 
accommodation request if needed in a way that still respects privacy. 
Furthermore, employers still maintain the undue hardship 
defense if they can show that an applicant or employee’s request would 
pose more than a de minimis burden.196  Specifically, if an employee 
can meet the expectations for hire, perform a job function, and the 
employer can reasonably accommodate that employee, then every 
reasonable measure should be taken to allow the employee to work.  
Ultimately, an employee should not have to choose between work and 
religion. 
At the very least, employers should document hiring decisions 
and mark down their commonsense observations of an applicant as 
evidence of an attempt to start an interactive dialogue.  As previously 
explained, given that motive is the deciding factor in religious 
discrimination claims, the majority’s approach creates a murky 
“suspicion” standard—one in which an employer is liable for having a 
hunch of a potential conflict, but failing to mention any such conflict.  
Documenting an employer’s internal evaluation process—specifically 
all factors unrelated to any protected traits—would better safeguard 
the employer and its hiring decisions. 
 
 196  Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2042 n.1; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 
432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977).   
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Religious discrimination claims are on the rise, and sensitive 
interests are at stake—particularly the employee’s right to religious 
freedom and the employer’s interests in economic liberty.  Employees 
want to feel protected and able to practice their religious beliefs.  
Employers, on the other hand, want to run their businesses efficiently 
and with autonomy.  As religious discrimination law continues to play 
a part in the American workplace, employers and employees must 
understand their rights.  Like other statutes that govern the workplace, 
religious accommodation claims require employer attention and 
compliance.  Title VII expressly prohibits religious discrimination by 
protecting those workers who hold—or who refuse to hold—specific 
religious beliefs, thereby ensuring fair employment.  Yet, an employer 
might find it difficult to comply with the law, as there is not yet a clear 
framework for proving the “motive” requirement without 
demonstrating “knowledge.” 
Thus, it is essential for employers to adopt policies that comply 
with the approach in Abercrombie.  But if faced with a future lawsuit, it 
is reasonable for employers to make the argument, based on Justice 
Alito’s concurrence, that knowledge is still required to show motive, 
and any lack of knowledge shields employers from liability. 
 
